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DRAFT

FRIEDRICHS: AN UNEXPECTED TOOL FOR
LABOR
Heather M. Whitney*
Forthcoming in N.Y.U. Journal of Law & Liberty (Supreme Court Review)

Today, about half of U.S. states allow unions and publicsector employers to privately negotiate for agency shop arrangements. Under such an arrangement, employees in a bargaining unit
who choose to not join the union (and thus do not pay membership
dues) are required to pay a fee to the union that covers their share of
the costs the union bears as their collective bargaining representative.1 Union cannot avoid these costs. As is the case under the NLRA
for private-sector unions, states require an exclusive bargaining representative regime. That is, if workers want to guarantee that their
employer will sit down and bargain with their representative, those
workers must ensure that their chosen representative is not just chosen by them but supported by a majority of workers in their bargaining unit – a bargaining unit they do not get to choose for themselves.2
Once their representative is chosen by a majority in that unit, the representative is then the exclusive representative for all the unit members, even those who do not want that representative bargaining on
their behalf. Because the union represents all members of the bargaining unit, the law also requires the union to represent all members
equally. The union cannot, for instance, bargain for a raise for union

* Bigelow Fellow & Lecturer in Law, University of Chicago Law School. The author
wishes to thank Will Baude, Genevieve Lakier, and Laura Weinrib.
1
See, e.g., Jurupa Unified School District and National Education Association – Jurupa,
Collective Bargaining Agreement at section 6 (July 1, 2014) (Membership/Service Fees provision) (the CBA at issue in Friedrichs).
2
For public teachers in California this is mandated under the Education Employment
Relation Act. Under the Act, public school teachers have the right to “form, join, and participate in the activities of employee organizations of their choosing for the purpose of representation on all matters of employer-employee relations.” Cal. Gov’t Code s. 3543(a). Exclusive representation is required under s. 3544-3544.9.

1

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2687276
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members only. If the union extracts additional benefits from the employer on behalf of workers, both union members and non-members
must share in those gains equally.3
As a result of government-imposed exclusive representation
and fair representation requirements, the government has created its
own free rider problem. Once the union has been elected, a worker
knows she will get any benefits the union can provide without ever
having to join, and thus pay membership dues to, that union. Agency
fees (also known as “fair share” fees) are intended to combat this
problem. By requiring non-members of the bargaining unit to pay
their share of the costs, some free riding is avoided.
Despite the importance of agency fees to avoiding the problem of the free rider, this Court may soon find that the agency fee
system violates the First Amendment rights of the workers required
to pay them. The Supreme Court previously considered and rejected
this argument in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education. There, the
Court held that requiring non-members to pay the union for the costs
it incurred for collective bargaining and contract administration did
not violate the First Amendment, though requiring non-members to
pay for the union’s political activities would. In Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association, the Court will squarely address whether
it should overturn Abood. The argument is that the distinction Abood
drew between political and non-political union speech is an impossible one, as all union speech in the public-sector context is political
and thus all compelled funding is unconstitutional. The Court will
also decide whether an opt-in system of dues payments is constitutionally required. Betting on what the Court will do is a dangerous
game but it seems likely, given language in other recent cases, that
Abood will be overturned and public-sector employers will no longer
be free to negotiate agency shop arrangements with their workers’
unions.4
There are a lot of issues that have to be dealt with in Friedrichs – why and when compelled funding compelled speech and
3
This includes arbitration over statutory rights. See Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S.
247, 271 (2009) (finding duty extended to arbitrating age discrimination claims under the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) when the collective bargaining
agreement required arbitration of those claims).
4
See Knox v. Service Employees International Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277
(2012); Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014) (refusing to apply Abood to “quasi” public
sector workers and thus finding the agency shop arrangement to violate the First Amendment).

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2687276
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whether the fact that the government is acting as an employer will
come to bear on the Court’s First Amendment analysis being just two
of them. These are important questions that many scholars will cover
in the lead-up to this case. I will not add to the pile. Instead, here I
want to think about this case from a different perspective. That is, if
the Court does overturn Abood, what does that mean for unions and
the future of labor more generally. There are three questions I want to
focus on: first, does the government-created free rider problem,
where unions are now required to provide free services to nonmembers, create a takings issue? I think under current precedent the
answer is no. Second, if it violates the First Amendment to require
non-members to pay agency fees, does the entire exclusive bargaining regime and corresponding duty of fair representation violate the
First Amendment rights of unions? I think there are reasons to believe
it does. And last, what effect will Friedrichs and its progeny have on
the future of labor organization? Here I suggest that while it is possible these cases will “kill” labor, there is another story that is possible
and indeed supported by history and current events: a backlash
against union repression resulting in the mobilization of labor. No
longer finding the NLRA and state-equivalent bargain worth the
price, workers may decide it better to fight outside that system. Below I take each of these questions in turn.
TAKINGS FROM UNIONS

Does requiring the union to provide services to non-paying
non-members constitute a taking, at least when doing so requires the
union to expend money? If you take the position that “all regulations,
all taxes, and all modifications of liability rules [should be understood as] takings of private property prima facie compensable by the
state” the answer is easy: yes.5 Conversely, if you are an originalist
and believe the Takings Clause was narrowly meant to require compensation when the government exercises its power of eminent domain – that is, when the government physically seized property – the
answer is also easy: no.6 But if what we are asking is whether there is
a colorable argument that requiring exclusive representation that non5
Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain
(1985).
6
For this view see William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 782, 840 (1995).
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members do not have to pay for constitutes a takings given current
case law, the answer is complicated. The Court’s takings jurisprudence is a conceptual mess.7 Given that, while there are some cases
that support such a conclusion, those cases stand on unstable conceptual grounds.8
That the prohibition on agency fees could constitute a taking
when combined with the duty of fair representation appears to have
been first suggested by Chief Judge Wood, in her dissent in Sweeney
v. Pence.9 There, the Seventh Circuit had to decide whether Indiana’s
“right to work” law was preempted by federal labor legislation and,
even if it was not preempted, whether it violated the First Amendment rights of unions.10 As Chief Judge Wood saw it, the duty of fair
representation in conjunction with the Indiana statute, which prohibited the employer and union from negotiating any contract that required non-members to pay money to the union to cover their share
of the costs,11 meant the state took the union’s money by requiring
the union to expend money to provide services to non-members.
Judge Wood found this scheme to look like the one struck down in
Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington.12 There, a state required
interest income that was generated by clients’ funds held in lawyers’
trust accounts to be transferred from the account to a foundation that
provided legal services to the poor. The Court held in Brown that the
interest was the property of the clients and if the government was going to require it to be transferred from the account to the foundation,
that action had to be justified under the Takings Clause.13 Brown involved the government explicitly required a transfer of money from
one private party to another while the Indiana statute required unions
to provide services but was agnostic about which money (if any) had
to be spent to provide them, that distinction was thought irrelevant for
purposes of a takings analysis by both the majority and dissent. For
its part, the majority found that to the extent there was a taking, the

7

For a small sampling of criticism to this effect see XXXX.
This is a change from my prior position. See, e.g., Heather Whitney, “When does labor law violate the Takings Clause,” PrawfsBlawg (July 2, 2015); Heather Whitney, “Guest
Post: The Takings Clause and Sweeney v. Pence,” OnLabor (Sept. 4, 2014).
9
Full disclosure: I clerked for Chief Judge Wood.
10
Sweeney v. Pence, 767 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2014).
11
See Ind. Code § 22-6-6.
12
538 U.S. 216 (2003).
13
See 538 U.S. at 235.
8
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union was justly compensated for it through its continued exclusive
bargaining representative power.14
While the majority’s response is unconvincing,15 there is another difficulty with finding a taking and it happens at the threshold.
What private property does the government take when it requires a
private party to provide services to another?16 In this case, it appears
to be the money a particular union would have to spend to provide
the requisite services. But the argument that whenever the government requires someone to provide a benefit to another the Takings
Clause applies was rejected by a majority of the Justices in Eastern
Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998). There, a statute enacted in
1992 required companies that used to be in coal mining business to
contribute to a fund providing for the health-related expenses of retired miners and their families. The statute required Eastern Enterprises to pay for such benefits for miners it employed between 1946
and 1965, even though it never agreed to provide those benefits in the
original collective bargaining agreements. The expected liability created by the statute was between $50 and $100 million. While the parties did not raise the issue, nor did the Justices at oral arguments, the
Justices were split on whether the Coal Act took any property within

14

Sweeney at 21.
For one, this argument looks much like the one rejected in Loretto. There the Court
said that “a landlord’s ability to rent his property may not be conditioned on his forfeiting the
right to compensation for a physical occupation.” 458 U.S. at 439 n. 17. The Court went on
to say that such an argument “would allow the government to require a landlord to devote a
substantial portion of his building to vending and washing machines, with all profits to be
retained by the owners of these services and with no compensation for the deprivation of
space. It would even allow the government to requisition a certain number of apartments as
permanent government offices.” Id. The majority’s argument is similar. A union could avoid
the requirement by ceasing to be the bargaining representative of the workers who exercised
their federal and state rights to be represented by one just as a landlord could refuse the requirement by ceasing to be a landlord, but being a landlord and being a bargaining representative may not be so conditioned. See id. at 439 n. 17. Moreover, as the Court most recently reaffirmed in Horne, its “cases have set forth a clear and administrable rule for just
compensation: ‘The Court has repeatedly held that just compensation normally is to be
measured by ‘the market value of the property at the time of the taking.’” Horne at 16 (citing
United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 29 (1984) (quoting Olson v. United States,
292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934)). The compensation is the market value of the property (here,
money) the government took, not a hazy theory that the mandated exclusive representation
regime is a form of compensation for another mandate the union did had little choice but to
accept.
16
As scholars have noted, this threshold requirement is too often assumed. See Thomas
Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 Virginia L. Rev. at 891 n.20 (collecting scholarship criticizing the Court and scholars for overlooking this question). It is an assumption I have been guilty of in prior writings on this topic. See supra note 8.
15
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the meaning of the Takings Clause at all. In total five justices found
that it did not.17 As Justice Kennedy put it, “[t]he law simply imposes
an obligation to perform an act, the payment of benefits. The statute
is indifferent as to how the regulated entity elects to comply or the
property it uses to do so … To call this sort of governmental action a
taking as a matter of constitutional interpretation is both imprecise
and … unwise.”18 Indeed, the Court had previously rejected the argument that a takings occurs “whenever legislation requires one person to use his or her assets for the benefit of another.”19
While the line between a taking and regulation is already “difficult to discern or to maintain,” extending the regulatory takings
doctrine to situations like this one, where the duty merely requires the
union to perform a service, and where no specific property right or
interest is at stake, arguably takes what is already “one of the most
difficult and litigated areas of the law” and makes it more so.20 This
is not to say that the requirement that unions provide free services to
non-members is not a burden, but if the line between takings on one
side and permissible taxes and regulations on the other is to be maintained, finding a takings is more trouble than it is worth.
COMPELLED SPEECH AND ASSOCIATION BY UNIONS

The next question worth considering in a post-Friedrichs
world is whether, if compelling non-members to pay agency fees to
public sector unions violates the First Amendment, union’s First
Amendment rights are infringed by both the exclusive bargaining regime and corresponding duty of fair representation.
If the Court overturns Abood, it will likely do so by rejecting
the distinction Abood made between a union’s non-political and political speech and instead find all public sector union speech to be polit-

17

While there were five votes to find the Act unconstitutional, four did so as a takings
and the fifth vote, by Justice Kennedy, found the act a violation of substantive due process
while expressly finding the Act did not take property within the meaning of the Takings
Clause.
18
Eastern Enterprises, 524 U.S. at 540.
19
Eastern Enterprises, 524 U.S. at 555-556 (Breyer, J. dissenting) (quoting Connoll v.
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, 475 U.S. 211, 225 (1986)).
20
Id. at 540; 542.
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ical.21 Once collective bargaining-related speech is considered political, requiring unions to engage in that speech on behalf of nonmembers (by imposing on them the duty of exclusive representation)
should also be considered compelled political speech and compelled
expressive association. The same is true of the requirement that they
provide services to non-members (the duty of fair representation).
Start with the duty of fair representation. As mentioned previously,
the duty arises from the union’s role as the exclusive bargaining representative and requires the union to represent all employees within
the unit “without hostile discrimination, fairly, impartially, and in
good faith.”22 The duty applies at all stages of collective bargaining,
from negotiations to contract enforcement. Between requiring the union to represent and bargain on behalf of non-members, prohibiting it
to favor its own members, and requiring equal treatment through contract enforcement, the law compels unions to speak and negotiate
with certain individuals. Post-Friedrichs that is compelled political
speech and association.23
To overcome this infringement on the union’s First Amendment rights, other scholars have argued that the government must
demonstrate that it has a “compelling interest in requiring unions to
negotiate and grieve their nonmembers’ complaints without receiving
21
Of course, the Court could go the other way. That is, it could take the position that
compelled funding raises no First Amendment issues at all, even with the union speaking
politically. Like in Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47
(2006), the Court could find that agency fees do not involve compelled speech because the
non-members are not required to say anything and remain “free … to express whatever
views they may have on the [union’s collective bargaining activities].” Id. at 60. Or the
Court could find the compelled funding “ancillary to a more comprehensive program restricting [labor relations] autonomy” and thus acceptable. See United States v. United Foods,
533 U.S. 405, 406 (2001) (distinguishing Glickman, where mandatory assessments to promote tree fruit were upheld against a First Amendment challenge). I do not mean to suggest
the Court could not come to such a conclusion. However, here I mean to imagine a postFriedrichs world where plaintiffs win.
22
Steele v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 204 (1944) (under the Railway Labor
Act). The duty was extended to unions operating under the auspices of the National Labor
Relations Act in Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman. California mandated the duty via statute. See
e.g., California Educational Employment Relations Act, Government Code section 3544.9;
Higher Education Employer-Employee Relations Act section 3578. California adopted the
federal test for determining whether a union violated the duty of fair representation in
Romero v. Rocklin Teachers Association (1980). A union violates this duty if it acts in an
“arbitrary, discriminatory, or bad faith” manner. See Vaca v. Snipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177
(1967).
23
Indeed, Harris, where the Court held that the agency fee arrangement for quasi public
sector workers violated the First Amendment already found that bargaining is political
speech in the public-sector context. See Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014).
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just compensation and that this duty [is] narrowly tailored to effectuate that interest.”24 But that is the wrong question for two reasons.
First, whether the union is reimbursed for the compelled speech and
association the government requires it to take on may be relevant to
whether the system exacts as taking from the union but is irrelevant
to whether the government has a compelling interest in compelling
that speech and association in the first instance. We do not think the
problem in Barnette, where school children were unconstitutionally
compelled to salute the American flag, was that the government required that salute without paying the students, nor do we think the
problem would have been different if payment were involved; the issue was whether the government had a compelling interest in compelling the students to salute. In the exclusive representation context, the
government compels the union to speak on behalf of non-members
and to speak for them equally as much as the union speaks for its own
members. Post-Friedrichs, this set up compels the union to speak and
associate politically. Thus, in order to overcome the First Amendment challenge, the government must demonstrate a compelling interest in requiring that exclusive representation regime.
One might stop here and argue that the government does not
compel an exclusive bargaining regime. The union could instead operate a “members only” union, and indeed the language of the statute
at issue in Friedrichs suggests the availability of that option.25 However, that option is not in fact available to the union. In order for public sector workers to exercise their right to have their employer sit
down and negotiate with the representative of their choosing, that
representative is required under California law to be the exclusive
representative of that workers’ bargaining unit. 26 The same is true
under the NLRA. While the plain language of section 7 guarantees
covered employees “the right to … bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,” the Board has held that employers are not required to bargain with member-only labor organizations.27 Thus, in order for workers to guarantee their ability to bargain
24

Fiske at 462.
See Cal. Gov’t Code s. 3543.1(a) (“Employee organizations shall have the right to
represent their members in their employment relations with public school employers”).
26
See Cal. Gov’t Code s. 3543.
27
See Dick’s Sporting Goods Case 6-CA-34821 (June 22, 2006) (NLRB General
Counsel refused to issue a complaint against employer who declined to recognize and bargain with member-only union, finding “the employer in these circumstances had no obligation to recognize and bargain with the Council. This principle is well-settled and not an open
25
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through representatives of their own choosing, that representative
must represent all members of that worker’s bargaining unit. In the
same way a non-member of the bargaining unit is “forced” to pay
agency fees (or find another job), the members and union are
“forced” to associate with and speak with non-members (or lose their
statutory right to negotiate through the representative of their choosing). As long as the former constitutes an unconstitutional condition,28 so too should the latter; their First Amendment challenges
should rise and fall together.29
The question we are now left with is whether the government,
in 2016, can demonstrate a compelling interest in requiring an exclusive representative regime. The Court has previously recognized “that
a single employee [is] helpless in dealing with an employer; that he
[is] dependent ordinarily on his daily wage for the maintenance of
himself and family; that, if the employer refused to pay him the wages that he thought fair, he [is] nevertheless unable to leave the employ
and resist arbitrary and unfair treatment; that union[s] [are] essential
to give laborers [the] opportunity to deal on an equality with their
employer.”30 This is the reality for a large share of workers and as the
Court has said, Congress “[is] not required to ignore” the need for
collective action given this reality, and can thus “safeguard it.”31 Let
us then assume that the government has a compelling interest in regulating the employer-employee relationship in light of the risk of arbitrary and unfair treatment of the much less powerful workers at the
hands of employers. Promoting and safeguarding worker collective
action is a reasonable way to approach it, but we are still left with
issue … the statutory obligation to bargain is fundamentally grounded on the principle of
majority rule.”). See also Charleston Nursing Center (finding employer did not interfere
with employees’ section 7 right to bargain collectively when it refused to meet with a group
of workers).
28
And recall in the context of the NLRA, the Court has found the right of employees to
self-organize and select representatives of their own choosing for collective bargaining or
other mutual protection without restraint or coercion by their employer a “fundamental
right.” See Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937).
29
Another parallel worth drawing is between the First Amendment rights giving to corporations and unions. If one believes states cannot condition access to incorporation on the
waiver of First Amendment rights, then one should also believe states cannot condition the
right to negotiate collectively through a chosen representative on the waiver of First
Amendment rights. While there are interesting arguments for why the state should be able to
condition access to the corporate form in this way but assume for purposes of this article that
the current Supreme Court does not take that position.
30
Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1937).
31
Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1937).
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whether an exclusive bargaining regime is sufficiently tailored to
promote that interest. And here the argument becomes more difficult.
The government does not require unionization. The default is nonunionization and the government’s stated aim is to ensure employees
having the free choice to unionize or not.32 Why, if workers choose to
unionize, must they unionize under an exclusive bargaining regime?
It is understandable why the state of California prefers exclusive representation based on majority rule – dealing with a single representative for all workers may be easier than dealing with many.33 But,
first, in the absence of unionization, public-sector employers are in
the much more burdensome position of negotiating individually with
each employee. And second, convenience is no response to whether
exclusive representation is properly tailored to the government’s legitimate interest. The government and labor scholars must accept the
challenge of justifying the imposition of exclusive representation
where, post-Friedrichs, it compels political speech and association. I
am doubtful it can be done.
Instead of scholars defending the government’s compelling
interest in having an exclusive bargaining regime, some scholars
have argued for members-only (also known as minority) unions.34 At
least one has argued that the NLRA can be read to allow for member
only unions today.35 In my own work I have highlighted how workers
have worked together to extract gains totally outside the exclusive
representation regime.36 While it may be that in a world without exclusive representation workers need additional protections when
striking, picketing, and engaging in secondary boycotts, all of those
protections could be given without compelling union and nonmembers political speech and association.

32

XXXX
See San Mateo, 663 P.2d at 531.
34
Though they have only argued for this in right to work states and do not suggest it replace the exclusive bargaining regime elsewhere. See Catherine Fisk and Benjamin I. Sachs,
Restoring Equity in Right to Work, 4 U.C. Irvine L. Rev. 859 (2014).
35
See Charles Morris, The Blue Eagle at Work: Reclaiming Democratic Rights in the
American Workplace (2005).
36
See Heather M. Whitney, Rethinking the Ban on Employer-Labor Organization Cooperation, X Cardozo L. Rev. x (2016).
33

DRAFT

11/6/15 2:24 PM

Friedrichs

11

MOBILIZATION OF LABOR

So far I have raised and speculated about potential postFriedrichs First and Fifth Amendment issues. I want to end by speculating about the social and political implications of not just overturning Abood but of overturning it in an environment where NLRA-style
unionization is already difficult to achieve and an increasingly unattractive option for those interested in furthering the interests of workers.37 Here I suggest that while the dominant story is that Friedrichs
and its progeny are killing off unions, that story may be wrong. There
is instead an alternative story and it is one of worker and union backlash against courts and business interests they perceive as attacking
them.38 On this story, Friedrichs and its progeny have unintentionally
created a focal point – a rallying cry – around which workers and unions can mobilize, radicalize, and develop creative and powerful alternatives to New Deal-type unionization. Indeed, we may be in the
early days of that backlash now.
In her Harris dissent, Justice Kagan rightly pointed out that
where the law compels the union to represent members and nonmembers equally while also prohibiting agency fee arrangements, it
is in the economic self-interest of both those who support and oppose
the union to withhold payment.39 However, while Justice Kagan
seemed to worry that the absence of short-term economic self-interest
would result in the financial ruin of unions, we know that is not the
case. Today, 25 states already have right to work laws and in those
states we have not seen unions fall into financial peril.40 Instead the
enactment of right to work laws appears to result in a small drop in
union membership.41 But given that paying the union in right to work
37
Many scholars, myself included, have documented the Board and court-created difficulties modern unions face. See Heather M. Whitney, Rethinking the Ban on EmployerLabor Organization Cooperation, 27 Cardozo L. Rev. __ (2016), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2663593.
38
Backlash against Court decisions has been documented previously. See Michael J.
Klarman, How Brown Changed Race Relations: The Backlash Thesis, 81 J. American History 81 (1994).
39
See Harris at 22 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
40
See Scott Cohn, “An American workplace war that’s reached a tipping point,” CNBC
(May 29, 2015).
41
Here I am referring to drops in membership among bargaining units already organized prior to the enactment of the right to work law. Bureau of Labor Statistics data from
2000 to 2014 suggests that in right to work states union membership stabilizes at around 84
percent of represented workers. In contrast, states with agency fees over the same 14-year
period saw approximately 93 percent of represented workers as full union members. See Bu-
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jurisdictions can be understood as financially irrational, what might
explain worker support? Justice Kagan thought altruism or loyalty the
only available alternative explanations,42 but there are others. Unions
are among the types of private associations that make up a vibrant
civil society and make available to individuals a community and
sense of identity. Joining and supporting a union can be an important
social and political act, particularly in the wake of court decisions
that are perceived as an attempt to kill unions. Worker solidarity and
mutual aid, upon which unions are founded, are after all political and
social ideals.43 And, while it is too early to say, it may well be that as
the Court exacerbates the free rider problem unions face, unions will
look to stoke within workers the embers of a solidarity ethos that
were neglected so long as access to member money did not require
activation of such class consciousness.44 Group solidarity is in turn an
important precondition for the creation of social movement organization, like labor organizations, and social movement activism more
generally.45
Public sector union’s preemptive response to Friedrichs suggests such stoking has begun. Not intending to sit passively by and
await their demise, the possible elimination of agency fees has mobilized the organizations. The president of AFSCME said in a recent
interview that agency fee arrangements had made the teachers’ union
complacent. “I think we took things for granted. We stopped communicating with people, because we didn’t feel like we needed to.
That was the wrong approach, and we don’t want to fall back in to
that trap.”46 In anticipation of Friedrichs the union has taken steps to
remedy that error, creating a more engaged membership – a member-

reau of Labor Statistics, Economic News Release: Union Members Summary (Jan. 23,
2015), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm. The Mackinac Center
for Public Policy shows these findings most clearly. See Mackinac Center for Public Policy,
Amicus Brief in Support of Petitioners, Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association at 2122.
42
See id.
43
See Peter Kropotkin, Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution (1902).
44
See Julius G. Getman, Restoring the Power of Unions: It Takes a Movement (2010)
(arguing that organized labor needs to return to its activist member-powered roots and abandon, among other things, its current focus on money and economic power).
45
See Marc Dixon, Vincent J. Roscigno, Randy Hodson, Unions, Solidarity, and Striking, 83 Social Forces 3, 8-10; 23-24 (2004).
46
See Lydia DePillis, “The Supreme Court’s threat to gut unions is giving the labor
movement new life,” The Washington Post (July 1, 2015).
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ship that feels invested in and solidarity with the union and its leadership.47 Other union leaders have expressed similar sentiments.48
Workers and union mobilization in response to a judiciary it
thinks illegitimate would not be a historical anomaly. In the early
twentieth century, something similar happened and labor went outside the formal channels of politics and litigation and instead acted
directly, through mass protests, strikes, and boycotts.49 Today, we see
workers doing something not dissimilar, though admittedly so far on
a much smaller scale. Recognizing that the benefits of massive government regulation is no longer worth the costs, workers are developing non-traditional forms of worker organizations that entirely bypass
the NLRA and its state equivalents. Fight for $15, a movement
backed heavily by the SEIU to raise the minimum wage for fast food
workers to $15 an hour, is one particularly successful version of this.
The Immokalee Workers, who work to better conditions of tomato
pickers in Florida by targeting reputation-sensitive companies like
Taco Bell and national grocery stores at the top of the food supply
chain (instead of their direct employers) are another.50 For these nontraditional organizations, Friedrichs does nothing to slow their momentum.
In short, while Friedrichs may well overturn Abood and with
it a compromise that has lasted for decades, between the First
Amendment arguments it makes available to unions and the backlash
that is already brewing in response to it and the conditions in which
workers currently find themselves, I suspect the case will ultimately
be to the good of workers and their organizations.
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